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ABSTRACT
Guo, Shumin. M.S., Department of Engineering and Computer Science, Wright State University, 2014. Mining Privacy Settings to Find Optimal Privacy-Utility Tradeoffs for Social Network
Services.

Privacy has been a big concern for users of social network services (SNS). On recent
criticism about privacy protection, most SNS now provide fine privacy controls, allowing
users to set visibility levels for almost every profile item. However, this also creates a
number of difficulties for users. First, SNS providers often set most items by default to the
highest visibility to improve the utility of social network, which may conflict with users’
intention. It is often formidable for a user to fine-tune tens of privacy settings towards the
user desired settings. Second, tuning privacy settings involves an intricate tradeoff between
privacy and utility. When you turn off the visibility of one item to protect your privacy,
the social utility of that item is turned off as well. It is challenging for users to make a
tradeoff between privacy and utility for each privacy setting. We propose a framework
for users to conveniently tune the privacy settings towards the user desired privacy level
and social utilities. It mines the privacy settings of a large number of users in a SNS,
e.g., Facebook, to generate latent trait models for the level of privacy concern and the
level of utility preference. A tradeoff algorithm is developed for helping users find the
optimal privacy settings for a specified level of privacy concern and a personalized utility
preference. We crawl a large number of Facebook accounts and derive the privacy settings
with a novel method. These privacy setting data are used to validate and showcase the
proposed approach.
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1.

Introduction

1.1

Online Social Network

One of the most popular topics today on the internet is about social network. A social
network is a social structure made up of a set of social actors and a set of ties between
these actors [28]. These online networking sites resemble the structure of people and their
relationships in a social community and make the interaction of people much easier and a
lot faster.
In reality online social network is not a new idea. Early internet based system such
as the bulletin board, mailing list and discussion groups etc. are the social networks of the
early internet age. The property of such systems is that they are highly oriented towards
people with enough computer skills. Things are changing with web 2.0 [29] become the
trend of internet. The technologies for Web 2.0 makes it possible to design social networking sites that are accessible for people without enough computer skills. It features
friendly user interface, much easier operations and much better media supports including
text, images and videos. One other important reason for the popularity of social network
is contributed by mobile devices. With mobile devices and online social networks, it becomes possible for people to keep connect any time and from any where. To this sense,
online social networking is reforming the way people live everyday. And it has and will
enforce tremendous effects on our society.
As social network services (SNS) are becoming a popular phenomenon, people use so1

cial network services as effective means to do different kinds of things. For example, some
social networks such as Facebook and Google Plus are helping people to get connected
with friends, sharing photos, daily activities and so on. The social network site Linkedin
[15] is helping people to get connected with employers and their colleagues as well as finding jobs and interesting topics of their interests. The dating site match.com [20] is helping
singles to find their loved ones. Other technical social network sites such as github [7]
and stackoverflow [25] are greatly facilitating collaboration among software developers.
For example, github users can collaborate on software projects with people all around the
world and stackoverflow users can ask and answer technical questions, discussion technical
ideas and so on.
Online social networks are breaking the boundaries of countries and continents. They
are helping people in an unprecedented way to work together, to enjoy together and even
to live together. It promote the proliferation of information, and promotes the knowledge
among people. It is reasonable to believe that online social networks will be an important
part in our networked society and more and more online social network site will be build
to help people better their life and work.

1.2

The Online Social Network Privacy Problem

When online social networks become popular, many people are joining in one or even a
few online social network sites. But in order to join these sites, you actually need to have
yourself registered with your personal information. For example, a lot of social networking sites require an user to provide a user name, the real name, birth date, address, phone
number etc. For many people, these requirements are reasonable. And from a technical
perspective, the pieces of information help the online systems identify and index a specific
user. For example, if you want to find someone from New York city, the location information New York City becomes an critical piece of information. If the user you are looking

2

Visibility Level

Potential Audiences

Account Owner

Account Owner Only (private)

Friends

Account Owner and his/her friends

Friends of Friends

Account owner, friends and friends of friends

Everyone

Everyone that can access Facebook (Public)

for did not provide his/her address information, it is unlikely that you can find such a person. Another example for you to provide personal information is when you are using the
job seeking web sites such as Linkedin[15]. If the information you provided to Linkedin is
not complete or not valid, you will probably will miss out important job opportunities. The
purpose for most people to use the social network is to benefit from it, in this thesis we use
the word utility to describe such benefits.
Although it is necessary for the online social networking sites to collect personal private information, the information will be out of control by a user once it is provided to the
social networking site. In such a case, some consequences might happen. For example, the
social network service provider can use the personal sensitive information in an unexpected way such as selling it to a third party etc. Another example is that some curious users
might use the web search tools to find the information one shared on the social network
site. These raise the personal privacy concern on the social networking sites. In this thesis,
we will use the word privacy to describe users’ privacy concern of disclosing their private
information when using a social network. The disclosing of private information can raise
certain risks such as information spam [19, 6], insurance discrimination [30], and financial fraud [13]. More and more privacy incidents [3, 24] have educated people the risk of
disclosing private information. As a result, social network services have provided privacy
configuration options for users to tune their privacy preference. For example, Facebook
provides four visibility options (the account owner only, friends only, friends of friends,
and everyone) for 27 profile items. Table 1.2 summarizes the possible audiences who can

3

view the item for these four visibility level settings.
However, the fine-grained privacy tuning also brings great challenges to users. First,
many users may have no sufficient knowledge and patience to tune them and choose to
use the default privacy settings. SNS providers often set the visibility to the most public
level ”everyone” for most items, to maximize the utility of the social network as a whole.
Users need to check item by item manually to tune the settings, which is very inconvenient.
Second, when users tune privacy settings, the utility of SNS can be implicitly affected,
although the users may not be aware of it. For example, hiding contact information such
as email and phone number, the user may miss potential employers who want to contact
the user. Therefore, privacy settings also reflect an intrinsic tradeoff between privacy and
utility.
Users, who are confused with many privacy settings or unaware of the tradeoff between privacy and utility, will need an assistant tool to help them understand the settings
and recommend candidate settings aligned with their utility preference. New users of SNS
may not be aware of privacy risks [1], but they have much clearer intention on using the
SNS, i.e., getting connected with friends, and reaching out to potential employers, etc.
From the utility-centered view, it seems quite simple to set the visibility of the profile items. For example, a user looking for jobs via the social network can simply set all the related
profile items visible, such as address, phone, email, and education, for potential employers
evaluating and contacting her/him. However, when the user knows the potential privacy
risk for each item, she/he may not be so decisive - how should an ”acceptable” privacy
level be specified? does item X have higher privacy risk than item Y? And which items can
be selectively exposed so that the overall privacy risk is still acceptable?

4

1.3

Contributions

In this research thesis, we aim to develop a framework to help a new user to understand
the potential privacy risks based on the fellow users’ view, and achieve balanced and personalized privacy settings for a social network service. This approach tries to answer the
following questions: can existing users’ privacy settings be modeled to provide guidance
for a new user to choose desired optimal settings? Can we also derive implicit utility preference from privacy settings? How to find the optimal tradeoff between privacy and a
user-specified utility?
We mine real privacy settings crawled from a large number of user accounts in Facebook to answer the above questions. Although individual user’s settings might be noisy, we
observed surprisingly stable patterns with a large number of users. Based on the crawled
data, we employ the latent trait theory [4] to model the relationship between the privacy
settings and the existing users’ latent levels of privacy concern. With this model, the new
users can clearly understand the relationship between each profile item and the privacy risk
perceived by other users, and use this knowledge to appropriately specify his/her own privacy concern. The same set of data, with an appropriate transformation, can also be used
to model the users’ implicit utility preference. The utility modeling algorithm is further
revised to incorporate the new user’s utility preference and results in a utility preference
model biased towards this user’s preference.
Based on the privacy and utility models, we design an algorithm to find the best settings on a new user’s privacy and utility requirements. Once the privacy and utility models
are determined, each user’s privacy settings in the training data can be mapped to a tradeoff between privacy and the personalized utility. As the new user’s utility preference is
already reflected in the utility model, we can easily find the tradeoff cases that meet the
user’s privacy concern and maximize the preferred utility. Therefore, the framework can
satisfactorily address the aforementioned challenges of personalized privacy settings for a
social network.
5

Our approach has a number of unique contributions.
• We introduce the utility aspect into privacy settings, and allow users to find optimal
settings based on the tradeoff between privacy and utility.
• We develop a method to derive implicit utility preference from privacy settings, and
allow the utility modeling biased towards a user-specified utility.
• The experimental studies are based on a large amount of real privacy settings (from
over ten thousands of user accounts) obtained from the Facebook social network.
These data will be made available to the public with appropriate data sanitization.
In Chapter 2, we first review the latent trait theory that we will use to model the privacy
concerns and utility preference, then propose a best tradeoff model for finding optimal
privacy settings. In Chapter 3, we focus on the experimental studies on real Facebook data.
The related work is presented in Chapter 4 and we summarize this thesis in Chapter 5.

6

2.

Modeling the Facebook Privacy

Problem
In this section, we first present the Latent Response Theory. Then, we model the social
network privacy problem using the LRT model. Lastly, we present a tradeoff model for
user to find optimal tradeoff between privacy and utility.

2.1

Latent Response Theory (LRT)

Latent trait theory (or item response theory) [4] is widely accepted and used in psychometrics to design tests to measure human subjects’ abilities (or attitudes). The basic idea
is to build a mathematical model based on the subjects’ answers to a questionnaire. The
difficulty level of question is determined by the number of people who answer the question
correctly. Intuitively, the person who has higher ability should get more correct answers.
The latent trait model tries to find the probability relationship between the person’s ability
and his/her answers to the questions. This model can be used to understand the properties
of the questions, and thus determine whether these questions can be used to properly evaluate subjects’ certain trait. Latent trait theory can also be applied to understand subjects’
strength of an attitude. For example, in our study, we try to model the SNS user’s level
of privacy concern or implicit utility preference as the latent trait, using the users’ privacy

7

settings (equivalent to the questionnaire).
The latent trait model assumes there exists a function modeling the relationship between the person’s ability and the probability of giving the correct answer to a question,
which is often modeled as a logistic function [10] as shown in Figure 2.1. Let the person’s
trait be θ. The popular two-parameter model [4] is described in equation2.1.

P r(θ; α, β) =

1
1 + exp{−α(θ − β)}

(2.1)

where α and β are model parameters to be learned from the data. Figure 2.1 illustrates some sample distributions. X-axis represents the level of ability and Y-axis is the
probability of giving the correct answer to the item. When θ = β, P r(θ) = 0.5, thus,
β indicates the level of difficulty of the question for the ability test. β can have different
meanings when the model is used for different purposes (we will explain it for our purpose
of modeling). The slope of the curve P r(θ) at β is α/4, which indicates the discrimination
level of the question. If the slope is small, the probabilities of giving correct answers for
the persons of ability θ > β and for those of ability θ < β have small difference, implying
low discrimination.
It is impossible to use one question to model the latent trait. In practice, we use
multiple questions (e.g., k questions) for a number of persons (e.g., n persons), which result
in a n × k grading matrix {sij }. This matrix is used to learn the item models: P r(θ; αj , βj ),
j = 1 . . . k. Maximum likelihood estimation [4] is the most popular method for estimating
the parameters αj , βj , and also each person’s ability θi from the data. The goodness of fit
measure [4] checks the difference between the probability P r(θ; αj , βj ) and the frequency
of answering the question j correctly by the users at each specific level θi . If the sum of
differences for all items and users follows a χ2 distribution with p-value < 0.05, the model
fits the data well.
The learning process also finds an ability level θi for each person in the test. Often, the

8

α ŝƐƌĞůĂƚĞĚ
ƚŽƚŚĞƐůŽƉĞ

&ŽƌƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶϭ
&ŽƌƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶϮ

βϭ

βϮ

Figure 2.1: Sample logistic functions for modeling the probability of giving correct answers.
sum

Pk

j=1

αj P r(θi ; αj , βj ) is used to represent the adjusted average score for the answers

to the questionnaire at ability level θi . Correspondingly, the answers of a specific person
P
of ability θi are evaluated with the weighted original score: kj=1 αj sij , which should be
P
close to kj=1 αj P r(θi ; αj , βj ) for a well-fitting model. We will use the adjusted average
score to represent the privacy rating at a certain level of privacy concern.
There are a few unique benefits for using latent trait modeling for our work. First,
we can consider the profile items are the ”questions” that the user need to answer, which
reflects the level of privacy concern. Correspondingly, we can map the ”ability” axis to the
level of privacy concern. Second, the item-related parameter αi can tell us how important
this item works to describe the level of privacy concern. βi tells how people perceives this
item in terms of privacy. In next section, we will come to detailed modeling and explain
the rationale behind that.

9

2.2

Modeling Privacy and Utility for User Profiles

Our purpose of this research is two-fold. First, we want to understand the relationship
between privacy settings and user’s levels of privacy concern. Second, we want to study
the tradeoff between privacy and utility in different privacy settings. In this section, we will
focus on the modeling methods and then present the experimental results on real data sets
in next chapter.

2.2.1

Definitions and Notations

Each person’s account has a number of profile items that can be set to different levels of
visibility. These items can be email, birthdate, phone number, religious view, etc., which
are denoted as {I1 , I2 , . . . , Ik }. In Facebook1 , these items can be set to be visible by ”everyone”, ”friends of friends”, ”friends only”, or ”only me”, as shown in Figure 2.2. For
simplicity, we assume the disclosure setting is binary by merging the settings. It is not
difficult to extend the model to multiple settings [18]. Considering ”friends of friends”
are still strangers, we use ”disclosed” to represent ”everyone” or ”friends of friends”, and
”hidden” to other cases. Assume there are n users. The setting for item Ij of user Ui is
denoted as sij . Thus, n users will generate a n × k matrix of privacy setting.
In studying the level of privacy concern, we set ”hidden” to 1 to represent the preservation of privacy, and ”disclosed” to 0 to represent the loss of privacy. We call the binary
setting vector for a specific user a privacy configuration. One of the problems for a new
user of SNS is to find a right privacy configuration for his/her account. As disclosing or
hiding one item is also directly related to the social utility of that item, privacy settings can
also be used to represent the user’s implicit utility preference. When we study users’ utility
preference, we can set ”disclosed” to 1 to represent preserved utility, and ”hidden” to 0.
1

Facebook’s privacy control interface has been changed since we collected data, one additional option
”Custom” has been added to allow users to specify a list of users who can view an item

10

Figure 2.2: A screen shot of facebook’s privacy control.
Correspondingly, we call the flipped binary setting vector a utility configuration. We will
mine these data sets to discover the intrinsic relationships.

2.2.2

Modeling User’s Privacy Concern

Modeling user’s privacy concern is the first step to understand the tradeoff between privacy
and utility. This task can help understand how the privacy settings are linked to the SNS
user’s level of privacy concern, which will be extended to include the utility preference.
Intuitively, the more profile items the user tries to hide, the higher level of privacy concern
the user may have. However, items may have different weights in evaluating the privacy
concern. For example, the items such as phone number have well-perceived privacy risk,
and thus most users tend to hide these items. However, highly privacy conscious users
may also try to hide some items that most other users think OK to disclose. As a result,
two users with the same number of hidden items may have very different levels of privacy
concern, and the total number of hidden items may not accurately reflect the user’s privacy
concern. The latent trait theory can be applied to exactly address this kind of problem.
In our study, we define the latent trait as the level of user’s privacy concern, denoted

11

as θ, and each profile item as the question in the latent trait model. The privacy concern of
user Ui is a global variable consistent for the privacy settings of different items. We use θi
to describe user Ui ’s privacy concern. The item parameters αj and βj , j = 1 . . . k, and the

WƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŚŝĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƚĞŵ

user’s privacy concern θi , i = 1 . . . n, can be jointly learned from the privacy setting data.

ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ

ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ
ƵƌƌĞŶƚͺĐŝƚǇ

>ĞǀĞůŽĨƉƌŝǀĂĐǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶθ

Figure 2.3: β of the item model can be explained as how sensitive the item is perceived by
users. The lower the β is, the more users want to hide the item.
Figure 2.3 shows the probability distributions of three items among 27 items learned
from our experimental data sets. The result of modeling gives a quantitative description
on users’ privacy concern. Although the values on X-axis have no absolute meaning, they
represent a relative measurement to the levels of privacy concern. The item ”relationships”
has the smallest β. It implies that even users with low level of privacy concern will set
this item to ”hidden”. In other words, the privacy risk of disclosing it is well perceived by
most users. In contrast, the item ”current city” is only set to ”hidden” by some users who
have high level of privacy concerns. These users are more concerned with their privacy
than most other users, while most users may consider that disclosing this item has very low
privacy risk and may bring more utility, such as getting connected with unknown people in
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the same city.
Different from the other two, the item ”networks” has a very low discrimination factor,
meaning it is not an important factor for describing the level of user’s privacy concern.

2.2.3

Finding Optimal Privacy Configuration.

With the latent trait model, each user will get an estimated level of privacy concern, θi .
The weighted expected number of hidden items for the level θi is uniquely defined as
Pk
j=1 αj P r(θi ; αj , βj ), where αi serve as the weights for the items. We define this measure
as the privacy rating at the privacy concern level θi . There is a relationship between the
actual weighted number of hidden items and the privacy rating, according to the theory of
latent trait model [4].

Theorem 1 For an ideally fitting model, the actual weighted number of hidden items

Pk

j=1

αj sij

for the user Ui is the privacy rating, i.e.,
k
X
j=1

αj sij =

k
X

αj P r(θi ; αj , βj )

(2.2)

j=1

where θi is the user Ui ’s level of privacy concern.
This theorem gives the basis for finding the optimal privacy configuration for a desired
level of privacy concern. A new user can specify his/her level of privacy concern θ based
on the relative measure in the range [-4,4]: we can map the level of privacy concern to
the nine grades, from the lowest level of concern -4 to the highest 4. With the specific
θ, Algorithm 1 can be used to find the optimal privacy configuration based on the fellow
users’ privacy concerns. Algorithm 1 assumes the item models P r(θ; αj , βj ), j = 1 . . . k
have been learned from the training data. Also, the level of privacy concern for each user
in the training data has been calculated: θi , i = 1 . . . n. The algorithm first calculates the
13

privacy rating for the user-specified level of privacy concern θ, and then searches over the
training dataset to find out the users having the similar level of privacy concern |θ − θi | < ,
where  > 0 is a very small value, and these users’ privacy configurations form a candidate
set, from which the optimal privacy configuration is found so that the weighted number of
P
P
hidden items kj=1 αj sij is close to the privacy rating kj=1 αj P r(θi ; αj , βj ), according to
Theorem 1.
Algorithm 1 OptPrivacyConfig(θ, {θi }, {(αj , βj )}, S)
1: Input: θ the desired level of privacy concern; {θi }: the levels of privacy concern for the users

in the training data; {(αj , βj )}: the parameters for the item models; S: training data
2: T ← find the set of θi so that |θ − θi | < ;
Pk
3: p ← j=1 αj P rαj ,βj (θi );
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:

P
dopt ← kj=1 αj ;
OptConfig ← ∅;
for each user
Pk Ui having θi ∈ T do
p1 ← j=1 αj sij ;
if dopt > |p − p1| then
dopt ← |p − p1|;
OptConfig ← Ui ’s privacy configuration;
end if
end for
return OptConfig;

2.2.4

Modeling User’s Utility Preference

Note that Algorithm 1 only gives the way to find the privacy configuration for a specific
level of privacy concern, without considering the factor of utility. The other important goal
of our research is to understand the tradeoff between privacy and utility, which gives a
comprehensive guidance for users to set the disclosure level of their private information.
A Simple Utility Model
The next task is to model user’s utility preference. We notice that utility and privacy is
a pair of complementary factors - once one decides not to disclosure an item, any social
utility with this item is disabled as well. Based on this understanding, we propose the
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simple modeling method.
We transform the data to reflect users’ implicit consideration on utility preference. A
privacy setting of ”disclosed” now means preserving the utility of that item, while ”hidden”
means a loss of utility. They are mapped to 1 and 0, respectively, which is a flipped version
of the data for privacy modeling. Let s¯ij be such a setting used for utility modeling, i.e.,
s¯ij = 1 − sij .
We use the same latent trait modeling method to derive the simple model for utility
preference. For clear presentation, we use different symbols to represent the utility models.
Let φ be the level of utility preference and (λj , µj ) be the pair of parameters for item Ij .
The utility item model is

P r(φ; λj , µj ) =

1
.
1 + exp{−λj (φ − µj )}

(2.3)

The smaller the value of µi is, the more people choose to set the item ”disclosed”. Similarly,
λj serves as the discrimination factor as αj does for privacy models. Because of the use of
the flipped version of data, it is easy to derive that λj = αj and µj = −βj .
We can also similarly define the utility rating for the ideal utility configuration at the
P
level of utility preference φi , which is kj=1 λj P r(φi ; λj , µj ). According to Theorem 1, we
have
k
X

λj P r(φi ; λj , µj ) =

j=1

k
X

λj s̄ij

(2.4)

j=1

for ideal model fitting. Because s¯ij = 1 − sij and λi = αi , it follows
k
X

αj P r(θi ; αj , βj ) +

j=1

≈

k
X
j=1

k
X

λj P r(φi ; λj , µj )

j=1

λj +

k
X

(αj − λj )sij =

j=1

k
X

λj ,

(2.5)

j=1

which implies that the privacy and utility ratings are linearly related under the simple utility
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modeling. This relationship is critical for making the tradeoff between privacy and utility.
A Personalized Utility Model
Users often have clear intentions for using social network services, while having less
knowledge on privacy risks. Among the set of well-known social utilities, a new user
may want to specify his/her utility preference, and wish it is considered in utility modeling.
For simplicity, we describe the utility preference as the importance weights on the items,
denoted as a vector w = (w1 , w2 , . . . , wk ). For the items less relevant to the utility, the
user can assign 1 to them, while for a few relevant items, the user can assign a value larger
than 1 to overweigh them. Note that the user can also demote certain category of utility by
setting a weight less than 1 for the related items.
We develop an algorithm to incorporate these weights in learning the personalized
utility model. Intuitively, we want to overweight those samples consistent with the target
user’s preference. The key is to appropriately revise the likelihood function to incorporate
the weights for learning. Let’s start with the formulation of the likelihood function. Since
the privacy setting is a binary variable, the probability to set item Ij to s̄ij follows the
Bernoulli distribution:

P r(S = s̄ij |φi , λj , µj )
= P r(φi ; λj , µj )s̄ij (1 − P r(φi |λj , µj )1−s̄ij
=

exp{−λj (φi − µj )(1 − s̄ij )}
.
1 + exp{−λj (φi − µj )}

(2.6)

Normally, the training of latent trait model holds the assumption to simplify model learning
that a user’s setting for an item is independent of other users and other items [4]. With this
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assumption, we have the likelihood function

L(λ, µ, φ|S) =

n Y
k
Y

P r(S = s̄ij |φi , λj , µj )

(2.7)

i=1 j=1

P P
exp{ ni=1 kj=1 (−λj (φi − µj )(1 − s̄ij )}
=
Qn Qk
i=1
j=1 (1 + exp{−λj (φi − µj )})
where λ, µ, and φ represent {λj }, {µj }, {φi }, j = 1 . . . k, i = 1 . . . n, respectively. Over
weighting the item Ij by wj (wj > 1) is equivalent to adding more samples of Ij setting to
the training data, which can be directly reflected in the following likelihood function.
P P
exp{ ni=1 kj=1 (−λj (φi − µj )wj (1 − s̄ij )}
L(λ, µ, φ|S, w) =
Qn Qk
j=1 (1 + exp{−λj (φi − µj )})
i=1

(2.8)

We revise the original MLE learning algorithm to use this likelihood function. We will skip
the details of learning algorithm, and will show some experimental results later.

2.3

Mining the Tradeoff between Privacy and Personalized Utility

Note that for each user in the training data, we can derive a pair of privacy concern and
utility preference (θ, φ), which corresponds to a pair of privacy rating and utility rating
(p, u). These pairs represent the tradeoffs between the privacy and utility. We want to find
the ones that satisfy the specific level privacy concern and, meanwhile, maximizing the
utility.
Figure 2.4 illustrates a sample distribution of (p, u) pairs as we observed in experiments. A new user can specify a desired level of privacy concern θ. With the (p, u)
pair distribution, we can find the pair and the corresponding privacy configuration. The
17
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of finding the best tradeoff cases. The scatter plot of privacy vs.
utility forms a best tradeoff curve. With any given privacy concern level θ, the best tradeoff
utility level is the crossing of the horizontal line and the best tradeoff curve.

following Algorithm 2 can be used to find the optimal privacy configuration with user’s
specification on utility preference.
Algorithm 2 OptTradeoff(θ, S, w)
1: Input: θ: desired level of privacy concern; S: n users’ privacy settings on k items; w: the

weight vector for utility preference: (w1 , w2 , . . . , wk ).
2: {αj , βj , θi } ← Learn the privacy model with S;
3: {λj , µj , φi } ← Learn the personalized utility model with S and w;
4: for each user Ui do
P
5:
pi ← kj=1 αj P r(θi ; αj , βj );
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

P
ui ← kj=1 λj P r(φi ; λj , µj );
ti ← (Ui , pi , ui , θi , φi );
end for
T ←find the cases ti that |θ − θi | < ;
topt ←find the case in T that has the maximum ui ;
return the user Uopt ’s privacy configuration;
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3.

Experiments

The experimental study will be focused on three aspects: (1) preparing the real data and
study the characteristics of privacy settings, (2) using the data to train the proposed privacy
models and studying the properties of the item models; and (3) understanding the tradeoff
between privacy and utility with simple and weighted utility models.

3.1

Preparing Data

The first challenging problem is to get real privacy settings for a sufficiently large number
of users. Asking users to do survey is a time consuming process, and is often limited to
very small scale [17]. We need a large number of samples to reduce the model bias. We
design a novel approach to crawl and derive real privacy settings from a sufficiently large
number of Facebook accounts. This approach utilizes the friends of friends (FoF) networks
of Facebook accounts and derives the item privacy settings based on the visibility of the
item crawled using the normal account and a fake account with no friend.
Concretely, the method is described as follows. First, we login to Facebook with a
normal account and record all the FoF users of this login user and at the same time crawl
the visible profile items of these FoF accounts. In order to reduce sampling bias, we have
selected three independent user accounts for this data crawling purpose, and in the data
cleaning process, FoF accounts are selected for each account such that the percentage of
the overlap is less than 5%. The number of FoF accounts of one Facebook user often
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reaches thousands. Table 3.1 shows the number of FoF accounts reached by the three
normal Facebook accounts after cleaning the crawled data. Second, we login to the fake
user’s account that has no friend, and crawl the profile items of the recorded FoF accounts
of normal users again.
RealUser1

RealUser2

RealUser3

99

83

73

Original # of FoF

4104

5287

4376

Cleaned # of FoF

3798

4215

3552

# of friends

Table 3.1: The number of friends and friends of friends for three accounts.

Visible to Real User?

Visible to Fake User?

Privacy Setting

Y

Y

E

Y

N

FoF

N

Y

N/A

N

N

O/F

Table 3.2: Based on the item visibility from the real account and the fake account, we can
derive the privacy setting. ”Y” for Yes, ”N” for No and ”N/A” for impossible.
We can derive the privacy settings of the FoF accounts based on the visibility from the
real user and the fake user’s accounts. At the time we crawl the data, Facebook’s privacy
setting for each profile item has four levels: only the account owner who can see the item
(O), only the friends (F), friends of friends (FoF), and everybody in the social network (E).
If the real user can see a profile item of his/her friend of friend, we can simply infer that the
friend of friend has set this item’s visibility to FoF or E. Otherwise, the friend of friend may
set the visibility to O or F (or simply does not provide). The following inference matrix
(Table 3.2) can be used to derive the real privacy setting for the real user’s FoF accounts.
Note that for items invisible to both the real user and fake user, the observed user may
not even set the item values. This happens normally for items such as ”political views”
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and ”graduate school” (e.g., the user did not attend any graduate school). However, it is
consistent to treat them as ”hidden” cases.
According to the inference matrix, we can surely derive three levels of privacy setting:
O/F, FoF and E for each item. For simplicity, we merge two of the settings to derive the
binary settings: ”disclosed” and ”hidden”. There are two possible merging schemes: (1) E
→ ”disclosed”; O/F or FoF → ”hidden”; or (2) E or FoF → ”disclosed”; O/F →”hidden”.

dŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƵƐĞƌƐ

We consider friends-of-friends still strangers, and thus use scheme (2) in our experiments.

dŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĐŚĂŶŐĞĚŝƚĞŵƐ
Figure 3.1: Histogram of the number of changed profile items.
We can crawl 27 profile items, including bio, birthday, family, relationships, religion
views, political views, websites, photos, videos, links, notes, hometown, current city, education (high school, college, and graduate school), employers, activity, interests, phone
number, sex, facebookuri, and networks. In the default settings, except for ”interests”, ”political views”, ”religious views”, and ”phone number” set to ”friends only”, all other items
are set to ”everyone”.
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Figure 3.2: The percentage of users sets the profile item to ”disclosed”.
The collected dataset is then cleaned and analyzed to find the statistics of the change
of privacy settings. To determine how many profile items are changed for each account,
we compare the derived settings with the default settings. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution
of the number of items changed by the users crawled from Account 1. Since we consider
no-value items as ”hidden” items, Figure 3.1 shows different distribution from previous
study [17]. Among 3798 friends of friends of Account 1, everyone has changed some of
the profile items, while previous study shows about 20-30% users not changing any privacy
setting [9]. As we have mentioned, it is consistent to treat no-value items as ”hidden” items.
Thus, it will not affect our modeling.
Figure 3.2 shows the list of items sorted by the percentage of users setting the item to
”disclosed” (E or FOF). The figure shows that almost all the crawled users have disclosed
”friend list”, indicating users’ lack of knowledge on the implications or little privacy concern caused by this item, and on the contrary, a very small percentage of users have disclosed address and phone number, possibly because their associated privacy risks are well
perceived by most users.
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3.1.1

Modeling User’s Privacy Concern

In this set of experiments, we want to explore the relationship between the level of user’s
privacy concern and the item privacy settings.
The proposed modeling method (described in Section 2.2.2) is applied to generate the
item probability models. We pool the friends-of-friends records crawled from the three user
accounts and perform a five-fold cross validation to check the model validity. Concretely,
the data are randomly partitioned into five shares of equal size. In each round, we use four
of the five shares for training and one share for testing. The testing result is evaluated by
the goodness of fit measure [4]. The p-value is used to check whether the model fits the
testing data well (p-value < 0.05 suggests good fit). The testing results on the five folds

WƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇ

show the models are in high quality, with all p-values < 0.02.

͞EĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ͟ĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ
ŝƐƋƵŝƚĞĨůĂƚ͘

>ĞǀĞůŽĨƉƌŝǀĂĐǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ͗θ
Figure 3.3: The sketch of the item models for privacy modeling.
According to the latent trait theory, the items with β values in [-4, 4] are the most
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informative ones. Figure 3.3 shows the sketch of the learned item distribution models with
β in [-4,4]. Small β means many users tend to hide the item - the privacy risk is highly
perceived. Large β indicates only highly privacy conscious users tend to hide the item
and the privacy risk of that item might not be well perceived. In the item models trained
with the pooled data, we found the items ”family” and ”phone” have β values smaller than
-4, which means most users tend to hide these items. ”college” has a β value larger than
4, which makes sense since Facebook is originally designed for college students and thus
”college” is normally disclosed to distinguish where users are from. We select the top items
with the lowest β and the highest β in [-4, 4], as shown in Table 3.3. ”favorite quotations”
appears in the lowest five, partially because most people do not have favorite quotations. It
appears very few people try to hide interests, education, and employers, as they are also the
common things that people like to share with other people in real life.
Group

Profile Items

The lowest five

sex, photos album, myposts, favorite quotations, birthday

The highest five

interests, interested in, grad school, high school, employers

Table 3.3: Top items with the lowest and highest β in the range [-4, 4] for privacy modeling.
The other parameter α serves as a discrimination factor, showing how much the item
can contribute to distinguishing the level of privacy concerns. They are important in calculating the privacy rating of a privacy configuration. We found most items have α parameters
around [1, 2.5]. Only ”family”, ”college”, ”networks”, and ”phone number” have α less
than 1. This makes sense because most people hide ”family” and ”phone number”, and
most people disclose ”college” according to their β values. Although ”networks” has an
appropriate β (β = 1.79), its setting seems a random choice, not very related to user’s
privacy concern.
We can also learn each user’s level of privacy concern θi from the data. Figure 3.4
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EƵŵďĞƌŽĨƵƐĞƌƐ

>ĞǀĞůŽĨƉƌŝǀĂĐǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶθ
Figure 3.4: The number of users at different levels of privacy concern: θ.

shows the distribution of the number of users according to the level of privacy concern.
There is no user with θ < −2. Most users’ levels of privacy concern are around the median
θ = 0 and in the range [-1.5, 2]. Interestingly, there is a spike around θ = −1.2, and there
are also very few persons having θ > 2. Overall the mean θ is −0.063.
Figure 3.5 shows the relationship between the number of hidden items and the privacy
rating. Since each user has a unique θi , we can plot the weighted number of hidden items,
P
(θi , kj=1 αj sij ), for the user’s privacy configuration. Meanwhile, for each θi , there is a
unique privacy rating
Pk
j=1 αj P r(θi ; αj , βj ) (the red curve in the figure). The figure shows the weighted number
of hidden items are around the corresponding privacy rating. We can find the optimal
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^ĐŽƌĞ

ŽƉƌŝǀĂĐǇƌĂƚŝŶŐ
ǆƚŚĞǁĞŝŐŚƚĞĚŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ
ŚŝĚĚĞŶŝƚĞŵƐ

>ĞǀĞůŽĨƉƌŝǀĂĐǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶθ
Figure 3.5: Comparing the privacy rating and the weighted number of hidden items. The
optimal privacy configuration can be found from the blue ’x’ points that are close to the red
’o’ points.

privacy configurations around the points on or close to the curve of the privacy rating.

3.1.2

Characteristics of Our Sample Data

One may have questions on the bias of our data collection method, i.e., sampling the FoF
data for only three accounts is not representative enough. We argue that we only use this
dataset to demonstrate our methods, not intent to generate global models for the whole
Facebook community. However, the FoF data collected from different accounts indeed
show some interesting characteristics, which suggest data at this scale (e.g., thousands of
examples) might be sufficient to capture the global privacy-concern model.
26

>ĞǀĞůŽĨƵƚŝůŝƚǇƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞφ

Figure 3.6: Top: the the number of users at different levels of utility preference for unweighted utility model. Bottom: for weighted utility model (overweighting ”phone”, ”email”, and ”employers” by a factor 1.1)
We use the following method to understand whether the similarity between the three
sets of FoF data. First, we train the privacy concern model for each of the three accounts.
P
Then, we test each model with the three sets of FoF data, to find the (θi , kj=1 αj sij ,
Pk
Pk
j=1 αj P r(θi ; αj , βj )) for each user Ui in the dataset. rθi =
j=1 αj P r(θi ; αj , βj ) is
P
the ideal privacy rating for this user’s level of privacy concern θi , and pi = kj=1 αj sij is
the real privacy rating according to this user’s privacy configuration. If a model perfectly
fits the data, then these two values will be identical. Assume there are n instances in the
p
P
testing dataset. We define the root-mean-square-error (RMSE) as 1/n ni=1 (pi − rθi )2 .
Table 3.4 shows that for each model the three test datasets result in very close RMSE. We
also check the distributions of resultant users’ θ values and find their mean and variance
values are also very close (Table 3.5, where ”combined” means the model learned from the
27
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ůĞǀĞůŽĨƉƌŝǀĂĐǇĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ

DŽƌĞƉĞŽƉůĞƚĞŶĚƚŽŚĂǀĞ
ůŽǁĞƌƉƌŝǀĂĐǇƌĂƚŝŶŐƐ͕Žƌ
ŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚůǇŚŝŐŚĞƌƵƚŝůŝƚǇƌĂƚŝŶŐƐ

hƚŝůŝƚǇƌĂƚŝŶŐ
Figure 3.7: The tradeoff between the privacy and utility for unweighted utility model.
TestData1

TestData2

TestData3

Model1

2.624510

2.470485

2.416606

Model2

1.990507

1.725497

1.674528

Model3

2.701275

2.311214

2.122907

Table 3.4: Crossing-model testing results represented with RMSE. Model i is trained with
TestData i. The close RMSEs in each row means the corresponding model has similar
goodness-of-fit for the three sets of data.

combined data.). These results all suggest a certain level of similarity between the three
datasets.
In addition, since we have carefully selected the three accounts to make their FoFs
have low overlapping ( < 6% overlapping for each pair of accounts), it seems that each
dataset is sufficiently large to capture some shared global model. We will conduct more
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KƉƚŝŵĂůƚƌĂĚĞŽĨĨƐ

hƚŝůŝƚǇƌĂƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞǁĞŝŐŚƚĞĚƵƚŝůŝƚǇŵŽĚĞů
Figure 3.8: Each point in the tradeoff graph represents one user. The points around the
upper bound contain the optimal tradeoffs.
Model1

Model2

Model3

Combined

Mean of θ

-0.0625

-0.0680

-0.0521

-0.0659

Variance of θ

0.7087

0.6765

0.7031

0.6884

Table 3.5: Mean and variance of users’ θ values for different models.

experiments to verify this observation.

3.1.3

Modeling User’s Utility Expectations

Users often consider privacy settings based on an implicit tradeoff between privacy and
utility. As we have discussed in Section 2.2.4, users’ privacy settings can also be used to
model their utility preference. We use the same datasets with flipped values (”disclosed”
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is set to 1 and ”hidden” to 0) to model utility preference. We train the simple utility model
with this flipped dataset. As we have expected, the resultant item models satisfy the relationship λj = αj and µj = −βj . Due to the similarity with the privacy model, we skip the
details for the simple utility model.
We can tune the utility model towards a specific user’s preference of utility. A user
may specify a special use of social network services, such as job hunting. We then provide
a tradeoff function that is biased to the specific utility. This biased utility model is achieved
by overweighting the items related to the specified utility and learning the weighted utility
model as we described in Section 2.2.4. In the experiment, we overweight ”employers”,
”phone” and ”email” by 1.1 to make the privacy settings friendlier to job hunting. The
weight 1.1 can be understood as adding 10% more training samples that have the overweighted items disclosed. The resultant weighted model well fits the data with p-value
< 0.02. How to pick weight is a complicated issue, which will be addressed by our future
work. Here, we just want to show how the result looks by introducing the weights.
By comparing the weighted model and the original model, we found the β parameters
for the weighted items are slightly reduced and the α parameters are significantly increased.
Figure 3.6 shows the change of the number of users at different levels of utility preference.
Tradeoffs Without using the weighted scheme, we have shown that the privacy rating
is linearly correlated with the utility rating. Figure 3.7 shows the relationship derived from
the real dataset. As we expected, the relationship between these two factors is approximately linear. Overall, the distribution is biased to the utility side. However, it may not
be necessary that the users care utility more than privacy. More likely, many users are not
aware of the privacy risks and thus leave the default settings of most items unchanged. As
Barnes [1] mentioned, most young people care less about their privacy because they are
unaware of privacy risks. Because most Facebook users are young, it explains the overall
pattern. Other studies [21, 27] show that different groups of people may have different
preferences over privacy and utility of social network services, which will be explored in
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our future work.
Figure 3.8 shows the relationship between privacy and the weighted utility (with the
specified items overweighted by 1.1, and other items by 1), which is not linear anymore.
Note the points around the upper bound of the distribution represent the most interesting
cases. The tradeoff algorithm (Algorithm 1) takes these cases and generates optimal tradeoffs for a specific level of privacy concern.
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4.

Related Work

Privacy leaking may result in serious attacks to the SNS users. Spamming and phishing
[8, 12, 11, 19, 2], are probably the most popular attacks that utilize private information,
which may cause significant financial loss of the targeted users. As more and more people
are becoming SNS users, the privacy issues of SNS have great impacts on the whole society.
Fang et al. [5] consider the difficulty of tuning privacy settings for many profile items,
especially for a new SNS user. They propose to learn classification models from existing
users of the SNS. The classification models try to find the correlation between the user’s
account features, such as age, sex, and education level, and the privacy setting for each
profile item. New users can use the classification models to automatically determine their
privacy settings. There are several problems with this approach. First, the classification
models depend on and are biased by the training data, which do not incorporate the new user’s privacy preference. Second, it is difficult to evaluate whether the classification models
suggest appropriate settings, when the training data does not support high-accuracy classification models. Third, this approach does not consider a privacy setting is a tradeoff
between privacy and utility.
Liu et al. [16] proposed a framework for computing privacy score of users based on
users’ privacy settings. The latent trait model is also used to model the privacy score. Similarly, the privacy setting data is used to generate the item models. The sensitivity of an item
is defined as the item model parameter βj . The visibility concept is introduced, which is the
P
privacy setting sij for item Ij by user Ui . The privacy score is defined as kj=1 βj sij , which
32

looks like the weighted number of hidden items in our approach. However, the formula is
difficult to explain with the latent trait modeling theory. In addition, this approach does not
consider the utility factor as well.
Yabing Liu et al. [17] studies privacy settings of SNS users by using survey data.
The survey dataset is collected from 200 Facebook users recruited via Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Their results show that most users use default settings provided by the SNS, and
users have trouble to correct the default privacy settings, which supports the importance of
our study.
SNS users’ attitudes to the privacy issues of SNS were studied by Barnes [1]. The
author observed the privacy paradox problem of online social network: adult people are
concerned about the invasion of privacy while teenage people freely give up their personal
information. The main reason for the paradox is that teens are usually inexperienced and
thus unaware of the problems. Our study shows that overall people care more about utility
of Facebook than the privacy issues, which is probably due to the fact that most users of
Facebook are young people.
The tradeoff between utility and privacy is also studied by Norberg et al. [21]. Their
survey data reveals that people indeed provide significantly greater amounts of personal
information than they expected. They find that perception of risks has a negative effect on
peoples’ information sharing behavior, while on the other hand perceived trust or benefit
doesn’t have a clear positive effect on people’s sharing behavior. Utz et al. [27] also
studied the personal factors such as personal impression, narcissism and their relation to
users’ social network information sharing behaviors.
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5.

Conclusions and Future Work

In this thesis, we propose a framework to address the tradeoff between privacy and utility
for users’ privacy settings of a social network service. We use latent trait theory to model
users’ levels of privacy concern and levels of utility preference. We develop an algorithm
to incorporate users’ personalized utility preference in learning the utility model. Finally,
a tradeoff algorithm is provided for users to find the optimal privacy configuration based
on the desired privacy level and utility preference. The whole approach is validated and
showcased with a large real dataset crawled from Facebook.
The future work will be conducted along several directions. First, we will continue to
work on the problem of learning weighted utility model. In this thesis, we did not answer
how to set item weights for a user’s utility preference, which can be intricate. Further
study is needed to find (or learn) the appropriate weighting scheme for any specific type
of utility, so that users do not need to worry about the utility weights. Second, the current
personalized utility modeling considers the users having mixed utility preference. If we can
cluster the users by their utility preference, we can probably derive better privacy setting.
However, clustering users by their utility preference is another challenging problem. We
also consider collaborative filtering (CF) [26, 22, 14, 23] might be a relevant technique for
recommending privacy settings because our problem seems to have some similar settings
to the recommending systems.
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Appendix A

We are using generic web scraping technics to collect data from Facebook web pages1 . The
data flow graph for the experiments are described in Figure A.1.

Figure A.1: Data Flow of Experiments

Java Code to Crawl Facebook Profile Data
It is a challenging task to get user profile data from Facebook like social networking sites.
One reason is that a large portion of the web page contents are generated dynamically
1

The code shown in this part will be available on github at https://github.com/gsm1011/puts.
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Listing A.1: Code Snippet for Crawling Facebook User Profile Raw HTML Data
1

2

private static void scrollToBottom(WebDriver driver) throws ...
InterruptedException {
assert(driver != null);

3

// scroll page to the end.
while (true) {

4
5
6

Long y = (Long) ((JavascriptExecutor) ...
driver).executeScript("return window.pageYOffset");
long y1 = y.longValue();

7

8
9

((JavascriptExecutor)driver).executeScript("window.scrollTo(0, ...
document.body.scrollHeight);");
Thread.sleep(1800);
y = (Long) ((JavascriptExecutor) driver).executeScript("return ...
window.pageYOffset");
if (y1 - y.longValue() == 0) break;
}

10

11
12

13
14
15

}

using Ajax. This makes the simple web page downloading tools not working as expected.
Because such tools typically download a web page by sending simple HTML requests, and
a large portion of the dynamic content can not be obtained. For example, if one user has
a large number of friends, this method will download only a small portion of his/her list
of friends. Another reason is that social networking sites are enforcing restrictions on high
frequency HTTP/HTTPS requests. This means that we need to respect this restriction on
our crawling software to ensure our crawling tool work continuously.
The code snippet in listing A.1 shows how to trigger the Ajax code in order to download all the web page content from Facebook.

Java Code to Generate XML Data from Raw HTML Data
The goal of this data cleaning step is to remove the HTML tags and unrelated contents.
The result will be an XML data file for each user. The code in listing A.2 shows how to get
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clean data for the ”About” information for a user and save the information into an XML
file.

R Code to Plot the Graphs
The R programming language is a popular statistical language for exploratory data analysis
as well as machine learning analysis. We use the ”ltm” package to model our data using the
LRT model. The code snippet in listing A.3 shows how to plot the histogram of the users’
setting changes for each profile item.
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Listing A.2: Code Snippet for Cleaning the About Information of a User from HTML Data
1
2

3
4
5

try {
we = ...
driver.findElement(By.xpath("//div[@id='pagelet_timeline_medley_info']"));
} catch (Exception e) {
return ;
}

6
7
8
9
10

out.write("<about>");
//// Work and education
we1 = we.findElement(By.xpath("//div[@id='eduwork']"));
wes = we.findElements(By.xpath("//div[@id='eduwork']/table/tbody"));

11
12

out.write("<edu_work>");

13
14
15

for (int i = 1; i ≤ wes.size(); i++) {
// the group label such as "graduate school", is hidden, so a ...
normal xpath search can't find it.

16
17

18

19

we1 = ...
we.findElement(By.xpath("//div[@id='pagelet_eduwork']/div/table/tbody[" ...
+ i + "]/tr[1]/th"));
label = ...
(String)((JavascriptExecutor)driver).executeScript("return ...
arguments[0].innerHTML;", we1);
label = label.replaceAll("<[ˆ>]*>", " ...
").trim().toLowerCase().replace(' ', '_');

20
21

we1 = ...
we.findElement(By.xpath("//div[@id='pagelet_eduwork']/div/table/tbody[" ...
+ i + "]/tr[1]/td"));

22
23
24
25

if (we1 == null) txt = "";
// txt = we1.getText().replaceAll("<[ˆ>]*>", " ").trim();
txt = cleanTxt(we1.getText());

26
27
28
29
30
31

out.write("<" + label + ">");
out.write(txt);
out.write("</" + label + ">");
}
out.write("</edu_work>");
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Listing A.3: Code Snippet for Plotting the Privacy Setting Histogram
1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8

9

10

postscript(file="priv.theta.hist.eps");
num <- 40
maxmum <- 500
# par(mfrow=c(3,1));
hist(all.ltm.theta, num, main=NULL, xlab=(expression(theta)), ...
xlim=c(-3,3), ylim=c(0,maxmum), col="red");
# legend(1.8, 600, c("Utility", "Weighted Utility", "Privacy"),
#
lty=1:1, col=c("red", "green", "blue"));
hist(all.wgt.ltm.theta, num, main=NULL, ...
xlab=(expression(theta[w])), xlim=c(-3,3), ylim=c(0,maxmum), ...
col="green");
hist(all.priv.ltm.theta, num, main=NULL, xlab=(expression(phi)), ...
xlim=c(-3,3), ylim=c(0,maxmum), col="blue");
dev.off() ;
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